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Abstract—The advent of mobile applications collecting and
exploiting the location of users opens a number of privacy
threats. To mitigate these privacy issues, several protection
mechanisms have been proposed this last decade to protect
users’ location privacy. However, these protection mechanisms
are usually implemented and evaluated in monolithic way, with
heterogeneous tools and languages. Moreover, they are evaluated
using different methodologies, metrics and datasets. This lack of
standard makes the task of evaluating and comparing protection
mechanisms particularly hard.
In this paper, we present ACCIO, a unified framework to ease
the design and evaluation of protection mechanisms. Thanks
to its Domain Specific Language, ACCIO allows researchers
and practitioners to define and deploy experiments in an intu-
itive way, as well as to easily collect and analyse the results.
ACCIO already comes with several state-of-the-art protection
mechanisms and a toolbox to manipulate mobility data. Finally,
ACCIO is open and easily extensible with new evaluation metrics
and protection mechanisms. This openness, combined with a
description of experiments through a user-friendly DSL, makes
ACCIO an appealing tool to reproduce and disseminate research
results easier. In this paper, we present ACCIO’s motivation and
architecture, and demonstrate its capabilities through several
use cases involving multiples metrics, state-of-the-art protection
mechanisms, and two real-life mobility datasets collected in
Beijing and in the San Francisco area.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of smart and always-connected handheld devices
opens the way to a large variety of online services, such as
location-based services (LBSs for short), which provide users
with contextual and personalised answers. Location data is
extensively collected by mobile applications for commercial
or advertisement purposes [1].
However, analysing mobility data can reveal extensive in-
formation about the associated owners, such as where they
live [2], their daily activities [3] or more sensitive information
(e.g., their religion [4]). To mitigate these privacy issues, many
location privacy protection mechanisms (LPPMs for short)
have been proposed this last decade (e.g., [5]–[9]). These
LPPMs are typically used to protect (or sanitize) mobility
datasets gathered by an LBS before publishing, exchanging
or selling them to a third party (e.g., a marketing company
or an advertiser). Moreover, this protection process has re-
cently become compulsory for all companies and institutions
handling personal data of European citizens with the new
European General Data Protection Regulation [10], which has
come into effect in May 2018. The goal of LPPMs is two-fold:
enhancing privacy to protect users while preserving utility in
the resulting sanitized data. Indeed, the goal is not to prevent
the collection or usage of mobility data, but to do it while
preserving the privacy of users. However, due to the conflicting
nature of these two dimensions, there is a clear trade-off
between privacy and utility. For instance, a marketing company
buying such a protected mobility dataset should not be able to
re-identify the users or infer personally sensitive information
about the users (e.g., where they live, what is their occupation)
but it should still be able to extract some relevant signals it is
interested in (e.g., the activity patterns around a specific shop).
The offered privacy and utility guarantees are generally eval-
uated by LPPMs designers, either theoretically by proving a set
of theoretical properties (e.g., k-anonymity [11] or differential
privacy [12]), or experimentally by relying on ad-hoc metrics,
which largely vary from one LPPM to another. Moreover,
evaluating an LPPM is often performed by a monolithic code,
i.e., designed only towards this purpose, and which is not
always made available by their authors. To illustrate this issue,
we analysed nine state-of-the-art and representative LPPMs
(summarised in Table I and further discussed in Section III)
and pointed out that no LPPMs are evaluated using the same
metrics and the same datasets.
To deal with the issue of evaluating LPPMs, few solutions
have been proposed in the literature. For instance, Location
Privacy Meter [25] is a framework designed to quantify loca-
tion privacy. However, it has a strict underlying probabilistic
model that does not accommodate the large variety of LPPMs
and metrics that exist in the literature. GEPETO [26], in turn,
aims at visualising the impact of LPPMs and attacks through
a graphical user interface. However this tool only focuses on
re-identification attacks and does not allow the automation of
experiments. Moreover, both tools can only be executed on a
single machine, and therefore cannot exploit any clusters of
computing resources to speed up execution of long-running
experiments. From these observations, it clearly appears that
TABLE I
EXAMPLES OF EXISTING LPPMS, EVALUATED USING HETEROGENEOUS METRICS AND DATASETS.
Datasets Privacy Utility Performance



























































































k-anonymity Never Walk Alone [19] X X X X X
W4M [20] X X X X X X X
GLOVE [5] X X X
Differential privacy GEO-I [6] X X
Differentially private grids [7] X X X
Jiang et al. [21] X X
Other approaches Path confusion [22] X X X
Promesse [23] X X X X X X X
Plausible synthetic traces [24] X X X
there is a lack of a common platform to evaluate existing and
new LPPMs, and to perform comparative studies using novel
datasets and evaluation metrics. This poses real and important
limitations for the progresses and the reproduction of results
in this research area .
To overcome these limitations, we propose in this paper
ACCIO, an open and extensible location privacy experimenta-
tion platform enabling researchers to quickly design, launch
and disseminate reproducible location privacy experiments.
An ACCIO experiment consists of a workflow described
using a Domain Specific Language (DSL) we designed to
facilitate the configuration and deployment of sophisticated
experiments. More precisely, a workflow is a composition
of parameterisable operators which can be any mobility data
manipulation routine, whether it is an LPPM, a privacy or
utility evaluation metric (at the time of writing, 28 such
operators are implemented in ACCIO, and new ones can be
easily added). These workflows are then executed using on the
ACCIO platform, which can scale out from a single machine to
a distributed deployment on a cluster of machines or a custom
cloud infrastructure. Finally, our framework allows to quickly
analyse results through a Web interface, as well as to export
them in simple text files for a later analysis with custom tools
(e.g., Matlab or Python)
In this paper, we demonstrate the capabilities of ACCIO
through three different use cases. We evaluate three very
different state-of-the-art LPPMs (GEO-I [6], W4M [20] and
PROMESSE [23]) using various metrics and datasets. We show
that those algorithms can be unified under concepts provided
by our framework, and expressed elegantly with a few lines of
our DSL. The openness of ACCIO combined with its capability
to describe experiments using user-friendly DSL makes it an
interesting tool for practitioners and researchers to disseminate
reproducible results. Finally, ACCIO is available for download:
https://privamov.github.io/accio/
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. We start
by presenting the problem statement in Section II before re-
viewing related works in Section III. We then describe ACCIO
and its architecture in Section IV. We present our experimental
setup in Section V, and the three use cases considered to
demonstrate the capability of ACCIO in Sections VI-A to VI-C.
We finally conclude in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Location privacy protection mechanisms attempt to protect
users against privacy threats coming from their mobility data.
LPPMs are algorithms that transform raw mobility datasets
into sanitized mobility datasets. Many LPPMs have been
proposed these last years. LPPMs can be classified according
to the guarantees they offer to the users. The two most adopted
privacy guarantees are k-anonymity [11] and -differential
privacy [12]. While the former hides a user within cloaking
areas containing at least k−1 other users (e.g., GLOVE [5]), the
latter disturbs mobility data in such a way that it theoretically
bounds by a factor  the impact of one record (i.e., his presence
or absence) on the result of a specific processing (e.g., GEO-
I [6]). There are also LPPMs that do not fall into the above two
categories (e.g., [23], [24]) but focus on enforcing practical
guarantees such as protecting specific sensitive data.
LPPMs are usually evaluated either theoretically or practi-
cally using real or synthetic mobility datasets through a set
of metrics. Only a few publicly available mobility datasets
exist, the others are unfortunately proprietary and not shared.
Evaluation metrics include privacy, utility and performance
metrics. While privacy metrics quantify the effectiveness of
the mechanism to protect user privacy, utility metrics quantify
its ability to leave the data useful from the point of view
of a data analyst. Privacy and utility are highly conflicting
goals, which makes finding an acceptable trade-off between
them a difficult task. Finally, performance metrics quantify
the running effectiveness of a protection mechanism.
Table I shows a set of nine representative state-of-the-
art LPPMs, along with the metrics and datasets that were
used by their authors to evaluate them. The objective of this
table is not to provide an exhaustive survey of state-of-the-art
LPPMs 1, but rather to demonstrate the heterogeneity problem
we are addressing in this paper. Indeed, a quick bird’s-eye
view shows that metrics and datasets largely vary from one
LPPM to another. This heterogeneity makes it difficult to fairly
compare LPPMs. Indeed, a given LPPM can perform very
well under a particular combination of metrics and datasets
while being less effective in a different setup. For instance,
this aspect is demonstrated in [28] where GEO-I is evaluated
with privacy metrics (namely ”Attack correctness” and ”Data
distortion”) different from those used by their authors. This
study eventually showed that efficiently protecting privacy,
with respect to those particular metrics, was only achievable
by setting a very strong privacy parameter, which came at the
cost of a very degraded utility.
To summarise, different metrics and datasets are used to
evaluate LPPMs, thus making their comparison very difficult.
It becomes even worse when metrics are not clearly defined, or
when using proprietary datasets that are not publicly available.
The challenge addressed by ACCIO is hence three-fold. First,
we want to achieve reproducibility of published results. Sec-
ond, we want to achieve reusability. Indeed, researchers should
not have to reimplement again and again the same algorithms,
and should instead reuse existing and interoperable building
blocks. Third, we want to achieve extensibility, by allowing to
easily integrate a new algorithm and compare it to the state-
of-the-art solutions.
III. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we review existing works addressing the
challenge of easing the evaluation of LPPMs.
Location privacy frameworks. Shokri et al. proposed
a fully-fledged framework designed specifically to evaluate
location privacy [25]. Performance of an LPPM is quantified
by comparing the outcome of a privacy attack performed on
both the raw mobility trace and on its protected counterpart.
The whole evaluation process is split in five steps: 1) reading
data, 2) simulating an application, 3) applying an LPPM, 4)
executing an attack, and 5) evaluating its efficiency with a met-
ric. Each step can be replicated to compare different datasets,
LPPMs, attacks or evaluation metrics. Towards this purpose,
they propose several new attacks and formally define three
evaluation metrics: accuracy, certainty and correctness. They
actually implemented their framework as a tool and released
it under an open source license, along with its documenta-
tion [29]. However, this solution only works for probabilistic
LPPMs and is not adapted to more generic mechanisms such as
W4M or PROMESSE (i.e., limited reusability). Furthermore,
it only considers privacy when evaluating an LPPM and does
not consider utility nor the associated privacy/utility trade-off.
GEPETO [26] is a tool to study location privacy proposed
by Gambs et al. This tool allows to apply several LPPMs
on mobility datasets, and launch privacy attacks. It focuses
on visualisation by providing a graphical user interface to
1Review of state-of-the-art LPPMs is addressed in surveys such as [27].
display on a map results of algorithms. However, this tool
does not provide clear extension points to integrate new pieces
of code (i.e., limited extensibility), and as a GUI application
does not allow to easily script experiments (i.e., limited re-
producibility). It is worth noting that GEPETO’s authors later
extended their tool to scale out to large datasets by leveraging
MapReduce [30]. Conversely, the workflow-oriented structure
of ACCIO combined with its new DSL achieves together
reproducibility, reusability and extensibility.
Scientific workflow tools. Although our goal is to specif-
ically support location privacy research, there are some simi-
larities with generic scientific workflow management systems.
The latter are used to model experiments, launch them on
distributed architectures (e.g., a grid or a cloud), and provide
access to the results. They are more often used in disciplines
such as bioinformatics and astronomy. Pegasus [31] reads
workflows from XML files, in addition to providing program-
matic APIs for generating these files. This tool also comes with
a Web interface to monitor and debug executions. Swift [32]
provides a language roughly similar to C to describe com-
putations. It is then compiled and automatically parallelised
when possible. Kepler [33] comes with a desktop application
to create and execute workflows. It allows to visually connect
operations and see how they interact. However, all these tools
come with a set of operations targeted towards astronomy or
chemistry, and not for spatio-temporal datasets and location
privacy. The survey of Liu et al. [34] gives and extensive view
about scientific workflow management systems.
IV. ACCIO DESIGN
In this section, we present the design of ACCIO. As shown
in Figure 1, ACCIO is composed of several components. Users
interact with the server through a REST API which in turn
controls the experiment and its deployment as well as the
results. ACCIO is implemented and publicly available under
the GNU GPL v3 licence, and comes with a documentation
website [35]. It is made of almost 20,000 lines of code
written mainly in Scala (a language running in the Java Virtual
Machine) for the server, and about 3,000 additional lines of
Javascript for the Web interface.
ACCIO experiments are described as workflows linking
together basic building block called operators. We first in-
troduce the concepts of operator (Section IV-A) before to
present the workflow (Section IV-B). We then explain the
architecture of ACCIO and the deployment of an experiment in
Section IV-C. Finally, we present how ACCIO can be extended
in Section IV-D.
A. Operators
An operator is the basic building block of ACCIO. It acts
as a function in a program: given some inputs, it produces
some outputs. Each operator comes with a very clearly defined
interface: it defines the inputs it consumes and the outputs it
produces beforehand. Because inputs and outputs are strongly
typed, values are checked for correctness before actually
executing operators. Inputs and outputs have a name, a type
Fig. 1. Overview of ACCIO’s architecture: users use a client application to interact with the server, which in turn interacts with a library of ACCIO operators
deployed on some computing resources.
and possibly a default value (for inputs only). An operator then
consumes zero or several inputs and produces one or several
outputs. The outputs generated by the execution of an operator
are automatically collected and ingested back into ACCIO. An
example of operator is reported in Figure 2.
• Name: GEO-I
• Input: [White] Epsilon, a strictly positive floating num-
ber, which controls the privacy level
• Input: [Black] A single mobility dataset to protect
• Output: [Grey] A single protected mobility dataset
Fig. 2. Example of operator implementing GEO-I LPPM.
Operators are the basic execution units of ACCIO and
are always executed on a single machine. They define the
computing resources they need (e.g., the number of CPU cores
or the quantity of RAM) to execute properly. Operators are
stateless, should be side-effect-free and are assumed to be
deterministic. These constraints enforce the reproducibility. It
means that given some inputs, an operator should produce the
exact same outputs at each execution. Hopefully, we support
injecting some randomness through the notion of unstable
operators. The latter are given an initial seed, that can be
used later to initialise a pseudo-random number generator in
a predictable state, and hence use some kind of controlled
randomness.
Because of their simple interface, operators support a large
variety of algorithms, including LPPMs and evaluation met-
rics. ACCIO can accommodate LPPMs working with datasets
of various sizes and shapes, as well as metrics evaluating dif-
ferent privacy (from the classical k-anonymity and differential
privacy guarantees to metrics relying on elaborate attacks) and
utility (from simple information theoretical quantifications to
metrics relying on sophisticated data mining tasks) aspects.
Operators need to be implemented by developers following
a simple API. We provide more details about how to extend
ACCIO with new operators in Section IV-D.
B. Workflows
Experiments in ACCIO are described as workflows. A
workflow is a list of steps, where each step corresponds to
an instance of an operator with a set of inputs (specified
Fig. 3. Example of an ACCIO workflow that evaluates GEO-I LPPM with
two metrics. It describes experiments by linking operators together.
either directly or as a dependency to another step). These
steps then form a directed acyclic graph, where the edges
represent the data flowing between the steps. An example
of workflow used to evaluate the GEO-I LPPM is depicted
in Figure 3, the considered operators are briefly presented
in Section V-C. There is a single root step (i.e., with no
upstream dependencies to another step), DatasetReader
whose goal is to read a dataset stored somewhere (e.g.,
local disk or Amazon S3), and convert it into a standardised
format that all the operators will understand. This dataset
is then pre-processed by the TemporalSampling and
TemporalGapSplitting steps, in a sequential fashion.
Then, the GeoI step eventually produces a protected dataset
from the pre-processed dataset. Finally, the evaluation is
done in two steps: PoisRetrieval (privacy metric) and
SpatialDistortion (utility metric). Each of those steps
needs two inputs: a baseline (i.e., unprotected) dataset and
a protected dataset to be compared with that baseline. Be-
cause of there is no dependencies between these two eval-
uation steps, they can be executed in parallel. Lastly, the
PoisExtraction and GeoI/PoisExtraction steps
are intermediate steps whose goal is to extract points of interest
(i.e., all places where users stopped and spent some time [3]),
which will be used by the privacy metric.
When specifying a workflow, one essentially defines a list
of steps and how to connect them together, where each step is
a particular instance of an operator. To provide reusability,
the same workflow can be launched multiple times with
different parameters. While operators need to be implemented
by developers, workflows are represented either in JSON or in
our DSL, thus allowing anyone with basic scripting knowledge
to write such a workflow. In addition, reproducibility of results
are made easier by only disseminating ACCIO workflows.
Lastly, workflows are instantiated through jobs, where a job
is a single execution of a workflow with a given set of
parameters. We also support launching a batch made of several
jobs at once, thus allowing to test tens or hundreds different
combinations of parameters.
C. Architecture of ACCIO
As depicted in Figure 1, the core component of ACCIO is
the server which exposes a Thrift API2 to users. These users
exploit this API to create their experiments (i.e., workflows
and jobs), monitor progress and download results once they
are completed. We also provide a command-line application as
well as a Web interface to facilitate management. The ACCIO
server consists of the following main components:
CLI & Web interfaces. ACCIO ships both with a
command-line client and a Web application. While the web
interface is more targeted towards visually list experiments
(Figure 4a), monitoring the progress of jobs (Figure 4b), and
previewing results (Figure 4c), the command-line client is
more suited for exporting the whole results as CSV for a
more detailed analysis. ACCIO does not intend to be a full-
fledged analysis framework; we prefer to let the users have
the control over the tools they want to leverage, whether it is
Excel, Python or R.
Operators. A library of operators provide a defi-
nition and an implementation of a set of operators.
Built-in operators include pre-processing routines (e.g.,
TemporalSampling), LPPMs (e.g., GEO-I) and evaluation
metrics (e.g., SpatialDistortion). At the time of writ-
ing, ACCIO comes with 28 such operators, which correspond
to 3 LPPMs, 10 metrics, 14 pre-processing routines and one
dataset reader. A library of operators is a simple binary that can
be discovered and loaded by the server. The server uses them
to validate the correctness of workflows, while the computing
cluster needs these libraries to actually execute the operators.
Scheduler. A scheduler is an interface to interact with
computing resources. A job is typically split into a list of
tasks, each task corresponding to a step inside the workflow,
and hence an instance of an operator. Because each operator
declares its required resources, several tasks can be executed in
2Thrift is an Interface Description Language allowing to describe and
generate code for RPC servers and clients [36]. This allows us to build a
type-safe and efficient binary communication protocol.
(a) List of running jobs.
(b) Job under progress: five tasks have completed and two tasks are running.
(c) Previewing the results of a job.
Fig. 4. ACCIO comes with a Web interface allowing the user to monitor the
progress of jobs.
parallel, as long as computational resources are available in the
targeted resources (e.g., cluster). In practice, tasks belonging
to the same jobs without any dependencies between them,
as well as tasks from different jobs can be all executed in
parallel, thus resulting in maximising the resource usage. As
developing a new scheduler is outside the scope of this work,
the scheduler can be implemented by relying on well-known
resource managers such as Mesos [37] or HTCondor [38]3.
ACCIO also comes with a simple local scheduler, where tasks
are ran as sub-processes of the main server process.
Storage. Finally, the storage is responsible for persisting
jobs and tasks. We currently provide an in-memory storage
(mainly used for testing) and a MySQL storage.
D. Extending ACCIO
ACCIO has been designed to be extensible, which means
that several components have pluggable implementations: stor-
age, scheduler and operators. In this section, we give a hint
about how custom operators can be implemented.
At its heart, an operator is just a binary obeying to a
simple protocol: when executed, it receives as command-line
3Those are not actually implemented in ACCIO, but we plan to support
external computing clusters in the future.
argument the Thrift-seralised context of execution. The latter
includes the values of inputs, the seed allowing to inject con-
trolled randomness, and where to write the outputs. It should
then take care of returning a 0 exit code once successfully
completed, or anything else if the execution failed in some
way. Operators can be liberally used the standard output and
error streams, which may be captured and made available
to the users. Because these requirements correspond to the
standard Unix way of doing things, operators can virtually
be implemented in any language. In practice, we provide a
Software Development Kit to implement operators in Scala
through a lightweight interface.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Before to demonstrate the capacity of ACCIO through
different use cases in next sections, we present in this section
the considered experimental setup. We present the datasets
we use (Section V-A), the runtime environment (Section V-B)
and the relevant operators (Section V-C). This experimental
setup will then be used throughout the three different use cases
summarised in Table II.
TABLE II
DEMONSTRATION OF THE SOUNDNESS OF ACCIO THROUGH THREE USE
CASES.
Use case #LPPMs #Datasets #Metrics
1: Metric diversity 1 1 5
2: Dataset diversity 1 2 5
3: LPPM diversity 3 1 5
A. Datasets
A dataset of mobility data is a list of spatio-temporal records
where each record is the location of a given user at a given
time. These records are usually partitioned into mobility traces,
where each trace is the list of records belonging to a given
user. Real-life or synthetic datasets can be used to evaluate
LPPMs. While the former ensure to exhibit realistic behaviours
but are usually small and can be sparse, the latter can be
generated with any size. We use two real-life datasets to
evaluate ACCIO: Geolife and Cabspotting. The Cabspotting
dataset [13] contains GPS traces of taxi cabs in San Francisco
(USA), while the Geolife dataset [15] gathers GPS trajectories
of people during they daily life in Beijing (China) and around.
Table III highlights interesting features of those datasets.
TABLE III
FEATURES OF THE DATASETS USED TO EVALUATE ACCIO.
Dataset Time span #Users #Records Area
Cabspotting 1 month 536 11 million San Francisco area
Geolife 5.5 years 178 25 million Beijing
B. Environment
Experiments related to the use cases presented in next
sections were executed using the local scheduler (i.e., which
executes operators as subprocesses) on a single virtual machine
running Ubuntu 14.04, having access to 16 cores and 50 Gb
of memory.
C. Operators
We use the following subset of operators in our experiments
organised in three categories: pre-processing, LPPM, and
privacy and utility metrics.
Data pre-processing operators. The purpose of the pre-
processing is either to clean a dataset to remove outliers (e.g.,
remove too short traces), to enforce some features for a fair
comparison (e.g., sampling rate, duration), or to simulate an
applicative use case (e.g., sending data by batches of six
hours). We use two such operators in our experiments.
• Temporal Sampling: samples traces to ensure a min-
imum duration between two consecutive points.
• Temporal Gap Splitting: splits traces into two
new traces each time the temporal gap between two
consecutive points is greater than a specified duration.
Resulting traces are assigned to two different (virtual)
users.
In our case, the goal of the temporal sampling operator is
to reduce the size of the datasets to handle, as well as to
uniformise the sampling rate between different datasets. The
temporal gap splitting operator is then used to simulate a
crowd-sourcing application sending traces to a server when
the user is inactive.
LPPMs. These operators implement state-of-the-art pro-
tection mechanisms. We use three such operators in our
experiments.
• GeoI: implements GEO-I [6], which is an LPPM ensur-
ing differential privacy. This LPPM add a calibrated noise
controlled by an  parameter (the smaller , the higher the
amount of noise added to the raw data). This LPPM was
reimplemented from the methodology described by the
authors.
• W4M: implements W4M [20], which ensures k-
anonymity. More precisely, this mechanism enforces that
at least k users move inside a cylindrical volume of
diameter delta. We reused the binary that was made
available by the authors [39] and simply implement
converters between our dataset format and theirs.
• Promesse: implements PROMESSE [23]. This mecha-
nism aims to hide the POIs of users by using a speed
smoothing technique enforcing a constant distance alpha
between consecutive records. We wrapped the original
code of the LPPM to create an operator.
These LPPMs are all implemented in a different manner:
by reimplemented the state-of-the-art, by using original work
or by wrapping an existing publicly available binary. This
demonstrates the highly flexibility of ACCIO when it comes
to implementing operators for LPPMs.
Privacy and utility metrics. These operators evaluate either
the privacy gain or the utility loss between an original dataset
and its protected version from a LPPM. We use five such
operators in our experiments.
Fig. 5. Workflow to evaluate GEO-I LPPM with five different metrics.
• PoisRetrieval: implements the points of interest
retrieval metric [23], which quantifies how many points
of interest (POI, meaningful places where user spends a
certain amount of time such as home or work places) can
still be retrieved from a protected dataset compared to the
original dataset.
• CountQueries: implements the count query distortion
metric [20], which evaluates the correctness of randomly
generated count queries on a protected dataset. These
count queries operator aims at counting individual users
present inside a given area during a given time window.
• AreaCoverage: implements the area coverage met-
ric [20], [23], which assesses whether the mobility of
users in the protected dataset covers the same area than
the original dataset.
• SpatialDistortion: implements the spatial distor-
tion metric [23], which quantifies the spatial modification
of mobility of users between a protected dataset and the
original dataset.
• PoisReident: implements a re-identification met-
ric [28], which evaluates whether users can still be
re-identified from a protected dataset. The underlying
re-identification attack leverages the POIs of users to
compute the similarity between two mobility traces and
thus to perform the mapping of users.
Moreover, we need an additional operator to extract the
POIs from a dataset.
• PoisExtraction: extracts points of interest from a
dataset, using the algorithm described in [28].
While this last operator could theoretically be directly
embedded into the relevant operators (e.g., PoisRetrieval
and PoisReident), splitting this routine into a separate
operator favours the reusability.
1 uri = param("/path/to/cabspotting")
2 epsilon = param_set(0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1)
3
4 def PreProcess(data):
5 d = TemporalSampling(data, "5.minutes").data
6 d = TemporalGapSplitting(d, "6.hours").data




11 return PoisExtraction(data, diameter="200.meters",
duration="15.minutes")
12









18 AreaCoverage(train, test, level=13)
19
20 d = PreProcess(DatasetReader(uri))
21 Metrics(d, GeoI(d, epsilon).data)
Fig. 6. DSL to evaluate GEO-I with five different metrics.
VI. EVALUATION THROUGH USE CASES
To demonstrate the capacity of ACCIO, we present experi-
ments through different use cases. The objective of these use
cases is to highlight iteratively several important aspects of
location privacy experiments. We first expose an experiment
evaluating an LPPM with different metrics (Section VI-A).
We then evaluate this LPPM with different datasets (Sec-
tion VI-B), and finally we compare it against other LPPMs
(Section VI-C). For each use case, we present the workflow
and the associated DSL as well as the results of the targeted
evaluations.
A. Use case 1: Metric diversity
In this first experiment, we evaluate the GEO-I LPPM under
five different metrics. We build on the example workflow given
in Section IV-B, Figure 3 and add three more metrics to it. The
final workflow is depicted in Figure 5 where the new metrics
are in grey.
Overall, the whole workflow is expressed in 21 single
lines of DSL (or as little as 17 single lines of DSL, when
excluding blank lines), which is shown in Figure 6. This use
case shows that ACCIO can accommodate new metrics very
easily. Consequently, ACCIO makes it easier the experiment
of LPPMs with evaluation metrics that were not specifically
used their authors. This advantage makes the evaluation of an
LPPM more objective.
As depicted Figure 6, we launch this workflow to ex-
periment GEO-I with multiple configurations, with  ∈
{0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1}, and on the Cabspotting dataset.
Each operator of the DSL is parameterised with specific values
(e.g., for the POIs extraction a POI is defined as a place where
users stay in a diameter of 200 metres during at least 15
minutes). Configuration details of each operator are available

















































































































































(e) Utility – Area coverage (higher is better)
Fig. 7. Use case 2: Privacy and utility trade-off of GEO-I LPPM with five metrics and two mobility datasets.
experiment are shown in Figure 7. These results represent
the privacy and utility evaluation of GEO-I with five different
evaluation metrics. We remind that the lower , the strongest
the theoretical guarantee provided by GEO-I. Conversely, a
high value of  means a very relaxed theoretical privacy
guarantee. Results clearly show the trade-off between privacy
and utility. Until  = 0.001, privacy is perfectly preserved,
with respect to chosen privacy metric, at the cost of a degraded
utility (e.g., from 87 % to 12 % for Count queries with
 at 0.0001 and 0.001 respectively). Increasing  results in
weakening privacy while improving utility.
B. Use case 2: Dataset diversity
To highlight the flexibility and the reusability of ACCIO
workflows, in this second experiment we evaluate GEO-I with
the same metrics as in the first use case (Section VI-A),
but with an additional mobility dataset, specifically Geolife.
Consequently, the workflow DSL (Figure 6) remains the same
but we simply add a dataset in the uri parameter as follows
(Figure 8).
1 uri = param_set("/path/to/cabspotting",
"/path/to/geolife")
Fig. 8. Change in the DSL of the first use case (Fig. 6) to evaluate the GEO-I
LPPM with two datasets.
Results for all privacy and utility metrics under both datasets
are shown in Figure 7. An interesting observation can be
done from these results. Curves exhibit similar behaviours for
both datasets on all metrics, except for the re-identification
privacy metric. Indeed, Figure 7b shows a much lower re-
identification success rate when  > 0.01 for Cabspotting
dataset compared to Geolife dataset. As for evaluation metrics,
ACCIO also makes it possible to integrate additional datasets
very easily. Our observation with the re-identification success
rate shows how important it is to cross-validate results with
multiple datasets.
C. Use case 3: LPPM diversity
In this third and last experiment, we compare GEO-I against
two other LPPMs, namely W4M and PROMESSE. In this
experiment, we will use the very same metrics to compare
three extremely different LPPMs, enforcing different privacy
models. We use the same privacy and utility metrics than in the
first and second use cases (only with the Cabspotting dataset).
The changes compared to the DSL of the first use case are
reported in Figure 10 (we essentially add two new lines at the
end).
21 Metrics(d, GeoI(d, epsilon=0.001).data)
22 Metrics(d, Promesse(d, alpha="200.meters").data)
23 Metrics(d, W4M(d, delta="600.meters").data)
Fig. 10. Changes in the DSL of the first use case (Fig. 6) to compare three
different LPPMs.
For readability reasons, each LPPM is parametrised in such
a way that it offers a relevant trade-off between privacy and




















































































































(e) Utility – Area coverage (higher is better)
Fig. 9. Use case 3: Results of the comparison of three different LPPMs.
of previous use cases. Indeed, this value of  gave an almost
perfect privacy level with a minimal utility loss (compared
to  = 0.0001). W4M, in turn, is configured with k = 10
and δ = 600 metres. These values are chosen from analysing
the associated research paper, some experimental results, and
tips given by authors for reasonable parameters. We configure
it with k = 10 and δ = 600 metres. Finally, PROMESSE is
configured with α = 200 metres, which should hide properly
POIs extracted with a radius of 200 metres [23]. Compared
to the first use case, the DSL of this use case takes only two
additional lines to add the two new LPPMs.
Figure 7 exposes the results of this experiment. Due to
the relevant configuration of LPPMs, they all feature good
privacy levels. More precisely, a perfect privacy is achieved
for W4M with both metrics and almost perfect privacy for
GEO-I and PROMESSE (with an average POIs retrieval below
0.001 % and an average re-identification success rate below
0.003 %). However, large differences appear when evaluating
utility. They all show similar area coverage (i.e., between 50 %
and 60 %) but behave significantly differently in terms of count
query distortion and spatial distortion, where W4M obtains
the worst results.
VII. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented ACCIO, a framework designed
to enhance location privacy studies. This tool makes the
evaluation and the comparison of LPPMs easier by propos-
ing a unified and extensible framework including state-of-
the-art LPPMs, evaluation metrics and a library for spatio-
temporal data manipulation and pre-processing. ACCIO comes
with a user-friendly and expressive DSL to describe and
easily reproduce complex experiments on location privacy.
In addition, the user interacts with ACCIO via a Web or
command-line interface. Finally, this tool works as well on
a single machine as on a distributed system parallelising the
execution on multiple nodes. Through different uses cases,
we demonstrate how easy it is to launch experiments with
ACCIO going from the evaluation of one LPPM with few
evaluation metrics to more advanced experiments comparing
multiple LPPMs together.
Compared to previous state-of-the-art frameworks, ACCIO
brings reusability (which Location Privacy Meter [25] does not
provide easily, because of its strict C++ interface), extensibility
(GEPETO [26] claims to be extensible, but extension points
are not clearly documented) and reproducibility (GEPETO is
not easily scriptable). Reusability is provided by the concept
of a workflow that is a composition of operators. Because the
operators are simple binary executables, they are portable and
may be integrated with other workflow management systems
or called from other code, thus ensuring interoperability.
Moreover, the operator’s interface is generic enough to ac-
commodate otherwise very different algorithms. Extensibility
comes from well-defined interfaces and extension points, thus
allowing to easily integrate new operators into our platform.
Extending Location Privacy Meter or GEPETO, e.g., to add
a new LPPM, requires writing C++/Java code, recompiling the
framework and then executing it. Conversely, new operators
in ACCIO can potentially be developed in multiple languages,
and the operators’ lifecycle is managed separately from the rest
of framework. Moreover, writing experiments using existing
operators only involves writing a few lines of DSL (no
compilation is required). ACCIO has already been successfully
used by non programmers to experiment with location privacy.
Finally, this DSL allows to easily replay past experiments and
reproduce their results.
TABLE IV
SIZE OF WORKFLOWS EXPRESSED USING OUR DSL.
Use case Lines of DSL
1: Metric diversity 21
2: Dataset diversity 21
3: LPPM diversity 23
This goal of this paper was not to evaluate once again
state-of-the-art LPPMs but to highlight the flexibility and the
simplicity of ACCIO to design, deploy and reproduce location
privacy experiments. Table IV summarises the number of lines
it takes to describe the experiment associated to each use
case considered in this paper. For example, an experiment
involving an LPPM, two datasets and five metrics (i.e., the
second use case) needs only 21 lines of DSL to be written by
a researcher. For comparison, only the code of the operators
used in this experiment represents about 1,050 single lines of
code in Scala, which does not take into account the code that
would be needed to orchestrate them properly outside ACCIO,
nor the code dealing with reading and writing datasets (which
is a library integrated into ACCIO). Moreover, as showcased
during these case studies, ACCIO allows to very easily alter an
experiment (e.g., adding a new metric, a new LPPM, changing
a parameter), without having to recompile anything. The
DSL is currently oriented around easily expressing parameter
sweeps (i.e., testing several values of a set of parameters) or
variations of operators sharing a similar interface (i.e., testing
different LPPMs), in order to identify the best performing
configuration. We leave as future work the task to formally
evaluate the expressiveness of our DSL.
ACCIO can be easily enriched with new features and
operators (e.g., LPPM, evaluation metrics). As future work,
additionally to enrich the operators library with state-of-the-
art LPPMs and metrics, we plan to support more distributed
execution platforms, which are nowadays widely used by
researchers to run their experiments quickly. Another inter-
esting contribution would be to support streaming operators,
i.e., working on continuous streams of data. Moreover, from
our experience, visualising preliminary results can be of a
great help to debug issues or improve operators. Consequently,
improving visualisation tools to preview results could be also
an interesting feature to develop.
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